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Situation in the Far East 
There is nothing more transient than the au-
thority of a traveler in the Far East as a reporter 
of recent events. So much has happened since 
early December when I left Manchuria at the 
Siberian border after a sojourn of a little less than 
three months in China and Japan that a consid-
erable part of the information upon which I should 
have to rely in giving a picture of the situation as 
I see it today is information already at your dis-
posal. It will therefore be more profitable if I 
devote the greater part of what I have to say to a 
description and analysis of the background of the 
drama which is now being enacted. Moreover, 
observation of different phases of public opinion 
here since my return has led me to believe that a 
knowledge of the background is no less important 
than accurate knowledge of current happenings, 
if the significance of the latter is to be understood. 
I shall therefore try to sketch first some import-
ant features of the background, proceeding from 
that to a recapitulation of what has happened in 
Manchuria and the vicinity of Shanghai, and fin-
ally to a consideration of American policy as re-
gards the existing situation. 
The Question of Sovereignty. 
Let us first consider the question of sovereignty 
in China and also in Japan, with special refer-
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ence to its exercise in intercourse with other na-
tions and with each other. For it so happens that 
this very question of the exercise and expression 
of sovereignty, while raised in different ways in 
the two countries, is very near to being, if it is not 
actually, the most vital factor in the whole situa-
tion, with respect to each. 
It would be beyond my competence to discuss 
the subject of sovereignty as a technical legal 
question. But the phases of that subject to which 
I shall refer appear susceptible of statement in 
simple terms which I trust will not be open to 
technical objection. 
China's lack of complete sovereignty in the 
sense that its nominal Government, whether theo-
retically acknowledged by all the people or not, is 
not actually effective within its borders, and in the 
sense that includes the capacity to maintain a rea-
sonable degree of order and to observe interna-
tional obligations, is not only the cause of the 
grievances alleged to have been suffered by the 
Japanese, but is also the ground on which rests 
the Japanese claim that direct action to enforce 
their rights on Chinese soil is a matter of neces-
sary self-defense and not a violation of sover-
eignty. You cannot, they say, violate something 
which has only a :fictitious existence. How far can 
these claims be justified 1 
The Concept of Nationality. 
First of all it must be admitted that China has 
never had the concept of nationality in the sense 
that these words convey to us. This is not to be 
taken as a disparagement of Chinese political tra-
ditions. The concept of nationality as we under-
stand it has to a large extent been created by the 
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exigencies of intercourse between nations. An-
cient China got along quite happily, from her point 
of view, without such intercourse, although of 
course the country was far from impervious to 
infiltrations of foreign cultures, notably that of 
India. An important element in our concept of 
nationality is a well-organized government, 
whether autocr~tic or democratic, which exercises 
authority over a whole people, with codes or other 
systems of law prescribing the rights and duties 
of subjects or citizens. Ancient China was not 
wholly without government, but the authority de-
scending from the Throne, through ministers, 
viceroys, governors, and district magistrates, ex-
isted chiefly for purposes of tribute and taxation, 
and was not relied upon as the means of regulating 
the conduct of individuals. This does not mean 
that their conduct was not regulated; with due al-
lowance for differences in the conception of in-
. dividual and social interest, it was very admirably 
regulated by precept and tradition enforced by 
patriarchal and other social control, notably that 
of the trade guilds. It is contact with the outer 
world, with her neighbors and with other countries 
with whom modern China has been more or less 
forced into commercial relations, that has exposed 
the inadequacy of Chinese political concepts and 
traditions to cope satisfactoriJy with the obliga-
tions resting upon members of the family of ·na-
tions. 
It js this aspect of what I have roughly called 
Chinese sovereignty which is chiefly accountable 
for the whole tragic history of China's relations 
with other countries during the last hundred 
years, and this to her disadvantage rather than to 
her discredit; and it is the largest causative factor 
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in her recent troubles with Japan, whether these 
be regarded as a pretext for Japanese aggression, 
or as a complete justification for Japanese meas-
ures of self-defense. 
Chinese Sovereignty in Manchuria. 
To apply what I have said a little more con-
cretely to Manchuria, it should be added that, al-
though Manchuria has been admittedly a part of 
China and has been repeatedly acknowledged to 
be such by Japan, as well as by other countries, 
no government existing in China since the fall of 
the Manchu Dynasty has functioned as the gov-
ernment of Manchuria or of any of its provinces. 
When the Young Marshal, Chang Hsiao Liang, 
hoisted the Nationalist flag in Mukden in 1928, 
that was regarded as a significant gesture of ad-
herence to the Central Government; but neither 
before nor after that event did the writ of Nan-
king run in the Three Eastern Provinces, nor was 
the behavior of their inhabitants under the slight-
est control from the Central Government. If 
troubles arose, as they frequently did, between the 
Japanese and the Chinese in Manchuria, pro forma 
representations and protests might be addressed 
through orthodox channels by Tokyo to Nanking; 
and nominal assurances of attention might be 
given-or not, as the case might be; but if any-
thing required to be done on the Chinese side to 
protect Japanese rights or to remedy abuses, it 
had to be done by the local authority. The scene 
was admirably set for evasion and procrastina-
tion, if these were desired, as of course they were ; 
for Nanking disputed the very validity of the 
treaties and agre.ements under which Japan was 
carrying on her railroads and her commercial and 
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industrial operations in Manchuria. Nanking 
"passed the buck" to Mukden, and Mukden passed 
it back to Nanking. Meanwhile a multitude of 
grievances accumulated, any of which, with a rea-
sonably accommodating spirit on both sides, could 
have been settled in favor of one side or the other. 
An explosion of some kind was inevitable. 
Lack of Competent Authority Thwarts 
Amicable Adjustments. 
As we review the whole story of events begin-
ning with the outbreak on September 18, 1931, 
we see how constantly the lack of competent 
Chinese authority rises to thwart all efforts to-
ward peaceable adjustment. The situation has 
been aggravated ever since then at periods in 
which even the shadow of authority observable at 
Nanking has at times disappeared, and those most 
anxious to press measures of conciliation have 
been unable to locate the responsible authority. 
The nearest approach to such authority might be 
found at one moment in the Mayor of Greater 
Shanghai, at another in the general commanding 
the 19th Route Army, at another in the titular 
Minister of Foreign Affairs at Nanking, and at 
another in the person of General Chiang Kai-shek 
at Loyang or Nanking. Woe to the unlucky offi-
cial or general who in the exercise of his apparent 
authority might sign a truce or other agreement 
involving concessions hurtful to Chinese pride, 
for he would be a marked man thereafter. This 
lack of authority or timidity in exercising it has 
had much to do with the recent delays in bringing 
about a cessation of hostilities at Shanghai. 
Who can blame the eloquent, persuasivG, and 
doubtless sincere Chinese spokesmen in Geneva 
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and in the principal foreign capitals who have pro-
tested on behalf of their country against undi::;-
puted invasions of her territory in terms express-
ing readiness on China's part to take every meas-
ure and fulfil every obligation which a responsible 
Government could agree to-undertakings in Man-
churia to maintain order and enter into direct 
negotiations, if only the Japanese would with-
draw; undertakings at Shanghai to withdraw her 
own soldiers from the surrounding territory, if 
the Japanese would :first completely evacuate? And 
yet, neither in Manchuria nor in Shanghai were 
there any indications that the performance could 
match the promise. The obvious fact was that 
performance was impossible to guarantee, even 
with the utmost sincerity and goodwill at Nan-
king. 
The process by which serious friction or war 
between responsible and well ordered govern-
ments is avoided does not depend upon the absence 
of irritations and grievances. It is made possible 
partly by a conciliatory disposition on both sides, 
but chiefly by the fact that rational discussion and 
negotiation are possible at the initial stages of 
friction, with confidence on both sides that, if 
honest and apparently irreconcilable differences 
persist, resort to impartial methods of settlement 
will be possible and its terms accepted. It is easy 
to see, however, that the possibility of establish-
ing contact between the parties at the initial stages 
of trouble is of vital importance if peaceful rela-
tions are to be maintained. Without such contact 
small grievances grow into large ones and ac-
cumulate to a formidable bulk with the passage of 
time. Every encouragement is thus given to irre-
sponsible parties to retaliate aga~nst intolerable 
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abuses. This has been J apan's experience with 
China for many years and especially during the 
past two years. To say this is not to imply that 
the grievances are all on one side. As breeders of 
international strife unsatisfied complaints are mis-
chievous, not because either side is all right or all 
wrong, but because there is no means of handling 
and disposing of them. 
Expression of Sovereign Power in Japan. 
The definition and the location of the sovereign 
power in Japan has been a hardly less disturbing 
factor in the situation, although it has come into 
prominence rather in the precipitation of the con-
flict last September and in the subsequent handling 
of it by Japan up to the present time than in con-
nection with the fundamental merits of Japan's 
case. This factor may be described as a division 
or ambiguity of responsibility as between the par-
liamentary Government represented by the Cabi-
net, and the military and naval authority who 
regard their responsibility as being directly to the 
Throne, though dependent upon parliamentary 
grants of money. Apart, however, from the real 
if not nominal independence of the army and navy 
and their consequent ability to commit the Gov-
ernment through a fait accompli, there is also the 
factor of discretionary power vested in a military 
commander in the field to act in an emergency to 
protect his forces and the nationals for whose 
safety he is responsible from an immediate attack, 
or danger of attack, from opposing forces. It is 
my opinion that the military action taken by the 
Japanese on September 18 was actually the use, 
or abuse, of the discretionary power to which I 
have just referred. The action once taken, how-
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ever, was backed up by the highest military au-
thorities, while the civil authorities, taken un-
awares by the whole proceeding, were forced to 
make the best of it. They did so by minimizing 
the scope and importance of the outbreak and by 
giving to the other Powers assurances of Japanese 
self-restraint which they were subsequently un-
able to make good, owing to the emergence of the 
military part of the Government as sole masters 
of the situation. There is no reason to doubt the 
good faith in which these assurances were given 
by the civil government; and it is easy to imagine 
the embarrassment and chagrin which it suffered 
when they were belied by events. Inasmuch, how-
ever, as the Foreign Office remained as the chan-
nel of communication with the outside world, an 
attempt had to be made to rationalize the whole 
procedure after the event-a process which was 
facilitated by the normal growth of the war spirit 
to the point where national unanimity was virtu-
ally attained, at least so far as the feeling of the 
people was articulate. We are all too familiar 
with the development of nationalistic spirit and 
war fever in the Great War to require any ex-
planation of the steps by which the Japanese peo-
ple have come to the point of presenting a prac-
tically united front not only against China but 
also against criticism from abroad. The conflict 
or ambiguity of authority in Japan has also been 
masked to some extent by the retirement of the 
Minseito party in December, its replacement by 
the Seiyukai party, and the Cabinet changes which 
have taken place recently, all of which reflect a 
greater harmony, if not a real unity, of authority; 
but the latent disunity remains as a grave consti-
tutional defect which I believe the Japanese peo-
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ple would like to see changed by the same process 
as that which established the Constitution, 
namely, by the free and complete delegation by 
the Throne of the responsibilities of national de: 
fence to a government wholly and unequivocally 
responsible to Parliament, even if this change 
should reflect for the time being a less liberal and 
a more aggressive policy. 
Incomplete Sovereignty in China-Equivocal 
Authority in Japan. 
It is evident, however, that the foregoing obser-
vations affecting the definition of Japanese sov-
ereignty refer to something quite different from 
those referring to a lack of complete sovereignty 
in China. The equivocal location of authority in 
Japan does not imply the lack of real authority; 
it merely explains in large measure certain incon-
sistencies between official pronouncements and 
events that have transpired, especially during the 
earlier part of the past six months, If there have 
at times been similar inconsistencies in connec-
tion with the development of the fighting at 
Shanghai from a small scale to a large one, it is to 
be accounted for rather by the local military con-
trol, and the exigencies of the situation in the field 
than by a conflict of authority in Tokyo. 
Japan's Vital Interests. 
The next feature of the background to which I 
should like to call your attention is that of Japan's 
so-called vital interests in Manchuria. By these 
I refer not so much to the specific provisions of 
treaties and agreements on which Japan's rights 
in Manchuria are based; I refer rather to the un-
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derlying interests of food, trade and industrial 
development which from the Japanese point of 
view are vital to the welfare, if not to the very ex-
istence, of Japan as an independent nation. These 
underlying interests explain why it is that Japan 
insists on the validity of her treaties and agree-
ments with China. Japan's population has been 
increasing at the rate of nearly a million a year, 
and unless something happens to retard this rate 
of growth, relief must come either by emigration 
or by much more extensive industrial development 
as the basis of a foreign trade enabling her to im-
port the necessities of life. Both Japanese and 
foreign economists agree that even if unrestricted 
opportunities for emigration were open, they 
would hardly take care of more than ten per cent 
of the annual increment of population. This per-
centage would undoubtedly be much larger if 
Korea and Manchuria were available as fields of 
extensive colonization; but as a matter of fact, the 
Japanese will not go in significant numbers to the 
mainland, partly because of the rigor of the clim-
ate, and partly because the much lower standard 
of living of the Koreans and Chinese makes it 
practically impossible for Japanese farmers and 
petty tradesmen to compete with the native popu-
lation. A dependable source of agricultural and 
mineral products and expanding trade therefore 
offer the only way of providing a living for a rap-
idly growing population. It is possible, indeed 
not unlikely, that owing to the rise in the standard 
of living Japan will before long experience a tend-
ency toward a greatly reduced rate of increase in 
population, if not indeed a stationary position in 
this regard. But this is more a matter of prophecy 
than of reality, and it does not modify the univer-
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sal belief of the J apanese people that Manchuria 
as a source of food and raw materials and as a field 
for industrial and commercial development is an 
absolute necessity to the country. They urge this, 
however, not as an excuse for conquest, which they 
consistently disavow as a motive, but as a reason-
able ground for demanding from those who actu-
ally govern Manchuria cooperation in these rea-
sonable objectives of national policy, rather than 
constant obstruction and frustration of that 
policy. 
The Strategic Factor. 
Closely identified with Japan's economic inter-
est in Manchuria is her strategic interest in that 
area as a possible base of military operations hos-
tile to the independence and survival of Japan. 
The Japanese people will never forget what it cost 
them in blood and treasure to resist the Russian 
menace of 1904-05. To them that menace is not 
an academic theory such as General Staffs and 
War Colleges like to play with as an intellectual 
discipline for military experts. It is a living ter-
ror made only more real after the Russo-Japanese 
War by the discovery that their country was then 
so nearly at the end of its resources. Manchuria 
cannot be allowed either to harbor a hostile Power 
or to be in a state of anarchy such as to invite in-
fringement of its territory by such a Power. This 
is perhaps the most striking example in the world 
today of a realistic factor which the formal mech-
anisms for the preservation of peace have got to 
take into account. The subordination of law to 
public opinion and feeling, of which examples are 
not wanting in other fields of legislation, is never 
more clear or imperative than where the literal 
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application of international law and treaties is 
thought, whether rightly or wrongly, to be incom-
patible with the natural law of self-preservation. 
Whether this is a justifiable attitude or not, it is a 
real one and has to be taken into account as part 
of the objective background of Sino-Japanese re-
lations. 
Manchuria in September, 1931. 
With these facts and considerations before us, 
let us turn to the situation in Manchuria in Sep-
tember, 1931. Jap_an was in possession of the 
leased territory of K wan tung at the lower end of 
the Liaotung Peninsula, where the South Man-
churian Railway had its terminus at the Port of 
Dairen. It was also in possession of the railway 
zone comprising a narrow strip of land on either 
side of the roadbed extending north through Muk-
den to Changchung and southeast from Mukden to 
Antung at the Korean border. At the main rail-
way centers the zone was expanded to include a 
larger area to accommodate terminals, warehouses 
and various facilities incidental to the operation 
of the railway. Within the leased territory and 
the zone Japan exercised complete jurisdiction ex-
cept in regard to maritime customs and the salt 
revenue which remained within Chinese control; 
outside the zone Japanese and other foreigners 
enjoyed the rights of extraterritoriality as in other 
parts of China. In all other respects the vast ter-
ritory of Manchuria was under Chinese control 
with a provincial governor in each of the Three 
Eastern Provinces, but with Chang Hsiao Liang, 
the Young Marshal, as acknowledged overlord of 
the whole territory. His title of Vice-Comman-
der-in-Chief of the National Army was the sym-
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bol of his allegiance to the Government in Nan-
king. While Manchuria had enjoyed under the 
Young Marshal and his father, Chang Tso Lin, a 
greater degree of security and order than any 
other part of China, banditry was rife, and what 
was perhaps even worse, an army of 300,000 
soldiers constituted a heavy and needless burden 
on the resources of the country-a force probably 
twenty times as large as a well disciplined con-
stabulary competent to preserve order would have 
to be. The exactions from the people to maintain 
an army of 300,000 men and the expenses of the 
Young Marshal's court constituted an intolerable 
burden on the people. These exactions took the 
forms not only of oppressive taxation, but also of 
successive debasements of the currency, a method 
of confiscation as cruel as it was effective. 
Japan's Failure to Consult Other Powers. 
This state of affairs was of concern to Japan, 
as it would be to any foreign Power, only to the 
extent that it infringed or endangered its rights 
and interests. That it did so, and that every pos-
sibility of relief through direct negotiation or by 
an amelioration of conditions had been exhausted, 
is the basis for Japan's claim that her actions 
throughout the campaign have been purely defen-
sive. Particular incidents precipitating the con-
flict are of little importance as compared with the 
fundamental conditions I have described. From 
the point of view of the rest of the world, however, 
and especially from that of Japan's friends, it was 
unfortunate that defensive measures so clearly 
taking the form of an aggressive infringement of 
Chinese territory should not have been preceded 
by consultation with the League of Nations and 
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with the leading Powers parties to the Pact of 
Paris and the Nine-Power Treaty, so that Japan 
would not have acted as the sole judge of a pro-
cedure which, at least prima facie, was incompat-
ible with treaties the sanctity of which was a com-
mon interest of all the Powers. There is not a 
particle of doubt in my opinion that such consulta-
tion would have preceded military measures, had 
the action of the Government not been forestalled 
by the steps taken by the army in Manchuria-
steps rather unconvincingly justified by the plea 
of emergency. 
Annexation Not Desired by Japan. 
There is no reason, in my opinion, for refusing 
to accept at its face value the repeated declara-
tion of the Japanese that they never have aimed 
and do not now aim at the political annexation of 
Manchuria. Japan has no desire to assume the 
responsibilities involved in the government of a 
country consisting of nearly 30,000,000 Chinese. 
What she wants is a government of and by Chinese 
with whom she can cooperate on the basis of the 
treaties in the future economic development of the 
country. The :first step in this direction was the 
improvization of local governing committees of 
Chinese, employing police of their own national-
ity; the second step was the organization of a cen-
tral government of the territory under a Man-
churian chief. There is no denying that both local 
and territorial governments were set up by Japan-
ese and are still largely under Japanese control. 
In this sense they are puppet governments. But 
if Japanese hopes are realized of their actually 
developing peace and security to a degree not 






safeguarded by an eventual relationship not unlike 
that between the United States and Cuba, the pup-
pet government may be expected to become a real 
one under which the interests of both Japanese 
and Chinese will be secure. 
The Boycott in China. 
Something approaching an acquiescence on the 
part of foreign opinion in such a process was be-
coming more and more evident when the crisis in 
Shanghai was created by the Japanese naval dem-
onstration backing a demand upon the local 
Chinese authorities that the organization respon-
sible for the anti-Japanese agitation and boycott 
should be dissolved. A good deal of humor has 
been displayed over the alleged naivete of the 
Japanese in supposing that they could win Chin-
ese customers at the point of a bayonet. But this 
is not quite an adequate description of what they 
were trying to do. The anti-Japanese boycott had 
been going on a long time when the Japanese oc-
cupation of Manchuria brought it to a pitch of in-
tensity and severity never before witnessed in 
that land of boycotts. It went much further than 
mere abstention from buying Japanese goods. All 
intercourse with Japanese was forbidden by the 
so-called National Salvation and Anti-Japanese 
Association. Chinese employees were withdrawn 
from Japanese banks, :firms and individuals. Chin-
ese merchants in possession of Japanese goods 
were intimidated, squeezed, and imprisoned, and 
goods were confiscated, all by utterly lawless or-
ganizations. A "racket" of no small proportions 
developed through the sale of confiscated goods. 
It is true that the Chinese people were swept by a 
wave of anti-Japanese feeling that made the boy-
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cott at first almost wholly spontaneous; but its 
effectiveness and duration were largely due to the 
lawless activities of the organization. Foreign 
merchants in Shanghai last October stated that 
nothing approaching the intensity or effectiveness 
of this boycott had ever been seen before; and the 
Japanese merchants of Shanghai, usually to be 
found in opposition to any avoidable disturbance 
of international relations likely to hamper trade, 
asserted that so far as their business was con-
cerned, war could be no worse and they were there-
fore for the first time in favor of the most drastic 
action necessary to bring China to terms. 
What Happened in Shanghai. 
When the first demonstration of force was made 
at Shanghai, but before the fighting began, it was 
undoubtedly the belief of the Japanese that a show 
of force would be sufficient to bring compliance 
with their demands for the suppression of the dis-
order and violence to . which many of the 26,000 
Japanese residents were exposed, and for the dis-
solution of the boycott organization. These were 
reasonable demands if one could dissociate the 
situation in Shanghai from the continued viola-
tion of Chinese territory in Manchuria, but it was 
too much to expect that dissociation in the minds 
of the Chinese. When the Chinese mayor made a 
verbal compliance with the Japanese demands, he 
doubtless thought it wise to do so and meant what 
he said. He reckoned, however, without his in-
flamed fellow-citizens and the large number of 
Chinese troops in and about the city. The evidence 
that trouble was brewing was so plain that the 
Municipal Council of the International Settlement 
declared a state of emergency to exist, and that 
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declaration automatically placed the defensive 
forces of the Settlement-British soldiers, .Amer-
ican and Japanese marines, and the Volunteer 
Corps-at their stations along the borders of the 
Settlement. It is important to note that whatever 
may have been the blame attaching to the Japan-
ese by reason of their :first demonstration of force, 
their marines up to this point acted not as mem-
bers of an invading force, but in cooperation with 
the other defenders of the Settlement. The J ap-
anese sector ·was on the borders of Chapei, where 
6,000 Japanese men, women, and children were liv-
ing outside the Settlement. What happened next 
is not quite clear, but apparently the appearance 
of the Japanese marines was the signal for a fusil-
lade from Chinese soldiers and snipers, later rein-
forced by artillery :fire from armored trains in the 
North Station. Whether the Japanese marines 
were :fired upon before or after they crossed the 
boundary line, it would be ridiculous to suppose 
that their action was anything but defensive. They 
had their own 6,000 civilians to protect and their 
action, whether wise or not, requires no other ex-
planation; for the force of bluejackets was far too 
small to have attempted a seizure of the city. As 
subsequent events proved, a force ten times as 
large would hardly have sufficed for such a pur-
pose. 
Before condemning the Japanese for the ruth-
lessness of their action in Shanghai, it is well to 
understand what happened at the outset. What 
happened subsequently was that the small defen-
sive force and the civilians under their protection 
were in imminent danger of massacre by over-
whelming numbers. This explains the initial 
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bombing by airplanes in the vicinity of the North 
Station, a terrible procedure which however did 
not exceed in terror the situation it was intended 
to relieve. From that time on, nothing that hap-
pened can be ascribed to any prearranged plan. 
Hell had broken loose with both sides fighting des-
perately to hold their ground, and the tinder which 
had been lit by a few rifle shots grew into a con-
flagration which, through the weeks that ensued, 
became a major military operation demanding 
constant reinforcements on both sides, until :fin-
ally a force of nearly 50,000 Japanese succeeded 
in driving the larger Chinese army back a dozen 
miles away from the city. 
A Tragic Blunder. 
The Japanese failure to anticipate the conse-
quences of their first demonstration of force was 
of course from every point of view a tragic blun-
der causing the loss of thousands of Japanese and 
Chinese lives, the dispossession of hundreds of 
thousands of civilians, and the destruction of their 
ho;mes and places of business. The safety of the 
International Settlement was also gravely com-
promised. The Chinese were certainly no more 
disposed toward friendship with the Japanese, 
and the expenses involved on the Japanese side 
were a terrible burden on an already crippled bud-
get. All this was surely a ghastly demonstration 
of the futility of war. Yet when one considers the 
steps leading insidiously to the ultimate result, 
one sees that the fault lay in the rash appeal to 
force, rather than in any design on the part of the 
Japanese to bring about what actually occurred. 
But that again is the normal outcome of war. 
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The International Settlement. 
The whole episode at Shanghai has greatly in-
creased the difficulties growing out of the abnor-
mal status of the International Settlement which 
is actually something very much like a little in-
ternational republic on Chinese soil with a consti-
tution consisting of treaties and Land Regulations 
going back beyond the middle of the last century. 
It has a Municipal Assembly elected by foreign 
and Chinese ratepayers in which the British and 
the Chinese each have five representatives, the 
Americans two, and the Japanese two. It per-
forms all the functions of a municipal government, 
performs them well, and provides in the Settle-
ment an island of comparative security for about 
65,000 foreigners and 900,000 Chinese. The rela-
tive stability of this island of security has made 
it possible for Shanghai to become one of the 
greatest ports and markets in the world and an 
entrepot for all the trade of the Y angtse valley. 
While the armed defence of the Settlement has 
been proved on several occasions to be a necessity, 
it has never before been used as a base for any-
thing but defensive measures. When, in 1927, at 
the time of the anti-British boycott, there was a 
gathering of Chinese forces in the neighborhood, 
an emergency was declared to exist, and the de-
fence forces were stationed at the boundaries, just 
as they were stationed at the end of last January. 
The British also brought 15,000 troops to Shang-
hai for purposes of reinforcement, but while doing 
so Sir Austen Chamberlain notified the League of 
Nations of what was being done and explained 
that the object was purely the defence of British 
nationals. That explanation was apparently ac-
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ceptable. The Japanese have endeavored to base 
their recent action on the same ground of neces-
sary defence for their nationals, who vastly out-
number the British and were undoubtedly in 
greater peril, owing to the exposed position of 
6,000 civilians in Chapei outside · the Settlement. 
The action of the Japanese, however, was more 
open to the suspicion and fear of the Chinese that 
an extensive invasion was premeditated, although 
the relatively small number of bluejackets at first 
employed makes it reasonable to suppose that the 
Japanese had thought a mere demonstration of 
force would be adequate. Here was the fundamen-
tal error of judgment which the past experience 
of the Settlement and a better appraisal of the 
moral and military resources of the Chinese 
should probably have enabled them to avoid. 
The Official American Attitude: Protection of 
American Interests. 
The official American attitude toward the whole 
Sino-Chinese episode of 1931-32 has been gov-
erned by two considerations : the protection of 
American nationals and American interests; and 
secondly, as part of the latter, the fulfilment of 
international obligations to which the United 
States is a party. The United States Government 
has not conceived it to be its duty to pass judg-
ment on the underlying rights and wrongs of the 
situation, or to do anything that could be inter-
preted as taking sides or intervening in the con-
flict. That the suspension of diplomatic relations 
with Japan, an embargo on trade, or the prohibi-
tion of all intercourse on the part of its nationals 
would be taking sides, there can be no doubt; and 
nothing that has emanated from Washington 
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would justify the inference that any of these meas-
ures are contemplated. The overwhelming weight 
of public opinion as expressed by the press and 
the business community also seems to be opposed 
to them. 
Economic Measures Equivalent to War. 
On the other hand, a considerable section of 
.American opinion, led by men of the highest char-
acter and influence, has evidently regarded it as 
the duty of the .American Government to be pre-
pared for joint action with the League in apply-
ing against Japan the coercive measures of Ar-
ticle XVI of the Covenant. Another section of 
.American opinion is conducting an agitation in 
favor of individual abstention from the purchase 
of Japanese commodities. Both movements are 
alike in regarding the use of economic sanctions 
as something less than an appeal to force, as dis-
tinguished from pacific measures such as would be 
consistent with the letter, if not the spirit, of the 
Pact of Paris. It is a curious phenomenon that 
the most vehement supporters of economic pres-
sure are to be found in the ranks of the pacifists 
and of those who in general have been the strong-
est advocates of the substitution of reason and 
conciliation for the resort to force. In this re-
spect they have shown themselves far less con-
servative and conciliatory than those who doubt 
whether armed force can yet be eliminated as an 
instrument of national policy. I believe them to 
be guilty of a deplorable inconsistency, and the 
inconsistency becomes the more glaring if one 
considers two grave implications of the kind of 
intervention they so casually and lightly propose. 
The :first is that the suspension of trade, in the 
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volume that now goes on between the United 
States and Japan, would have many of the conse-
quences of war-consequences which all of us re-
gard as the most terrible-namely, the suffering 
of millions of non-combatants who have had no 
part in the :fighting and no part in determining 
the policies leading to war. It is ridiculous to sup-
pose that such suffering is limited to the pocket-
books of a few capitalists: it means incalculable 
hardship and widespread starvation among the 
masses, whose economic reserves are already at a 
low point. The second implication of economic 
sanctions is that they would inevitably be taken, 
and quite naturally taken, as hostile acts justify-
ing resistance. If this be true, economic sanc-
tions, however sanctified by inclusion in Article 
XVI of the Covenant, would be very hard to recon-
cile with the pacific measures dictated by the Pact 
of Paris as the exclusive instruments of national 
policy. The very agitation in favor of embargoes 
and boycotts has made the identical impression in 
Japan that would be made by the advocacy of war, 
and it is rapidly filling a reservoir of national 
antipathies which are the worst fruits of war. If 
American interests or the sanctity of peace treat-
ies require protection by war, then let us have 
economic sanctions by all means, and let war come, 
but let us avoid the hypocrisy of pretending that 
we are employing the harmless instrumentalities 
of peace. 
' 
A Premature American Commitment. 
In only two points do I :find fault with the atti-
tude of our Secretary of State, who it seems to me 
has otherwise admirably and courageously defined 
the limits of American concern with the Sino-
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Japanese situation. The first is his statement 
that the United States will not recognize any ar-
rangements arrived at as a consequence of a 
breach of the Pact. A complete reservation of 
the American right to recognize or not to recog-
nize such arrangements should have been the limit 
of that declaration. The United States should al-
ways remain free to determine its attitude toward 
a de facto situation in accordance with all the cir-
cumstances and interests involved at any given 
time, present or future. The second fault which 
I have to find with the Secretary of State is the 
implication of his letter to Senator Borah that 
just because the Nine-Power Treaty was entered 
into in plain view of China's chaotic condition and 
in order to protect her integrity by abstaining 
from any interference with it during her efforts 
toward internal order, there could be no limit to 
the patience and self-restraint imposed upon an 
aggrieved neighbor, and no limit to the amount of 
injury to be suffered by that neighbor without re-
taliation. Mr. Stimson's doctrine of indefinite 
patience is indefensible in principle, however open 
to examination may be Japan's own construction 
of the amount and duration of her grievances. 
Adequacy of Peace Machinery. 
A final word as to the adequacy of the machin-
ery of peace. I am a firm believer in the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations and the Pact of 
Paris as important steps toward the abolition of 
war. It would be fatuous to maintain or to expect 
that they would be adequate to meet every strain 
that could be put upon them. Experience has 
shown that the heaviest strain is produced by a 
conflict in which one party is conscious of intol-
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erable wrongs and injuries, while the other party 
is in such a continuing state of disorder that no 
authority competent or willing to discuss griev-
ances or to enter into responsible undertakings 
can be found. The machinery of peace does not 
necessarily contemplate two equal parties; on the 
contrary, the defence of the weak against the 
strong is one of its main objects. On the other 
hand, it does contemplate two parties who can talk 
to each other and to other parties disposed to offer 
mediation, and who can say authoritatively what 
they will and what they will not do. It is not 
enough that spokesmen should be found to give 
verbal assurances of what China, in the present 
instance, will do, or that she will be amenable to 
all the obligations imposed by treaties and the 
law of nations. There must be reliable evidence 
that they speak with full competence and author-
ity. This evidence as I have before indicated has 
been conspicuously wanting. 
Alternative Measures. 
If the existing machinery of peace is inade-
quate, I do not see the slightest excuse for aban-
doning faith in it, but rather the strongest rea-
sons for using it to the extent of its competence 
and for studying its defects with a view to rem-
edying them. At the moment, I see only two 
alternatives: the first is cooperative intervention 
by foreign Powers, preferably through the Lea-
gue. But this would involve the use of an inter-
national force in place of a resort to force by the 
aggrieved party. World opinion has obviously 
not arrived at the point where it is ready to or-
ganize or use an international force. The second 
alternative would seem to be direct action by the 
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aggrieved state, such action to be taken, not in 
complete disregard of the League or the treaties, 
but under the sponsorship of the League and with 
accountability to it: in other words, a sort of man-
date of the League, but a mandate sanctioning 
self-defense and the restoration of order in the 
region affected, with explicit disavowal of the in-
tention to use the mandate as a pretext for terri-
torial expansion or permanent violation of sov-
ereignty. The League itself should remain the 
judge as to the limits of such action and be a 
party to any permanent adjustment. 
Conclusion. 
To sum up, the imperfections of China's sov-
ereignty are the fundamental cause of her diffi-
culties with Japan, as with other countries. 
Japan's handling of her grievances against China 
has been seriously compromised by the emergence 
of the military authority and by its rather typical 
disregard of the civil government and of interna-
tional obligations when in conflict with its own 
view of military necessity. The attitude of the 
United States in limiting its concern to the protec-
tion of American nationals and interests has been 
wise, but the Department of State has gone too far 
in saying it would not recognize any arrangement 
arrived at through a breach of the Pact of Paris. 
A reservation of the American position in this re-
gard would have been sufficient. The Department 
also erred in implying that the Nine-Power Treaty 
engaged its signatories to an indefinite tolerance 
of the duration or amount of grievances occa-
sioned by China's lack of effective sovereignty. 
The existing machinery of peace seems inadequate 
to deal with a dispute between two Powers one of 
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which is lacking in effective authority and respon-
sibility. The alternatives must be either interna-
tional intervention through the League or direct 
action by the aggrieved State but under the spon-
sorship of the League and with accountability 
to it. 
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